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Abstract 
Interdisciplinary work avoids specialisation’s growing fragmentation, but it also loses the political advantage of setting 
criteria and patrolling boundaries. Research that faces the challenge of bringing together concepts from several areas 
(e.g. in deep ecology, health studies, and natural resource management) is often criticised for blurring distinctions, for 
being unscientific, and for being conceptually trite. 
In addition, disciplinary work produces advantages for its practitioners which those who attempt more open 
approaches rarely enjoy. Besides epistemic authority and public legitimacy, such advantages include a degree of 
control over resources, clearer standards for publishing, and a critical mass of disciplined members who protect the 
turf of their specialisation. 
How can interdisciplinary work in future best play the political game? Should interdisciplinary scholars be 
between the boundaries of other areas, exhorting those protected within to choose relevance and come out and do 
as we do? Do we need boundaries for interdisciplinary work, carefully and vigorously controlled, so that we too can 
form distinctions based on criteria for methodological rigour? Is there a place for full theoretical awareness of what 
distinguishes interdisciplinary work? If interdisciplinarity is to mobilise support, does it need, just like any discipline, its 
own self-regulating guild? 
 
The Politics of Disciplinary Advantage 
Interdisciplinarity cannot simply be about filling in gaps between disciplines, as if the travelling 
was only along and around the boundaries. There is residual subject matter inadvertently 
forgotten by the disciplines (see Campbell, 1986) but not from absent-mindedness. Discipline is 
caught unprepared by complexity. And real and pressing problems are complex (Booth et al., 
2000, p. 28).1 
The way in which we dealt with the complexity of one hundred years ago — an essentially 
disciplinary mode — has lost much of its application in contemporary translation. This is 
because the methodological investigation which has brought us to the current juncture has been 
so effective. Conceptual simplifications enabling system complexity to proliferate have created 
new conditions which must now be addressed via fresh forms of clarity. This understanding is 
embedded within the interdisciplinary charter. Interdisciplinary scholars hold in common the 
recognition that we need to create a new structuring framework which makes it progressively 
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less attractive to continue thinking and framing practices of understanding in disciplinary 
terms. 
The problem is that discipline, as a product of historical circumstance and driver of the 
hypercomplexity now overloading our capacities, is enshrined, at least in Australia, as the 
dominant mode of knowledge construction. The university is not just populated by fragmented 
disciplines, but defined as a place of learning through them. Using systems theory, Klüver and 
Schmidt (1990) extend this analysis to the European context, arguing that the university 
educates for the production of science, but only via the imperatives of the knowledge system (p. 
306). In turn, this system is itself mediated by disciplines because they serve as the principal 
environments for cognitive activity. Accordingly,  
 
the university, as part — not sub-system — of the cognitive system which 
overlaps with the education system, is steered by the procedural norms of the 
disciplinary subsystems. As sub-systems, the individual subject disciplines 
mutually provide environments for one another, and are largely autonomous in 
establishing their internal standards. (Klüver &Schmidt, 1990, p. 307) 
 
This inwardly referential character of modern discipline forms a major barrier to updating 
our approach to contemporary problems. Unless we find ways of challenging the hegemony of 
disciplinary “work,”2 it is unlikely that universities will be capable of responding to the 
challenges posed by the metanarratives of our time: “ecocatastrophe, the world economy, the 
technologizing of the lifeworld,” and the sexualisation of lived bodies (Taylor & Saarinen, 1994, 
cited in Luhmann, 1995, p. iv). These “incipient metanarratives involve . . . practices that have 
not yet been theorized,” (Taylor & Saarinen, 1994, cited in Luhmann, 1995, p. iv) and they are 
likely to remain undetermined in the contemporary disciplinary regime. The problem of 
modern discipline is a concern for the university as a whole. The relevance of universities to the 
societies in which they are embedded is under threat. 
In this context, any attempts to institute new models of understanding able to mediate 
contemporary complexity face a great deal of inertia. Discipline positions itself as a prototypical 
model for generating authority and thus sets the standards for judging what counts as 
knowledge and determines who will be afforded access to resources and influence. Deviance 
from its strictures can lead only to marginalisation. Under such a regime, interdisciplinarity can 
merely hope for reflected glory. It will retain a derivative status as long as practitioners frame 
their petitions for integrative strategies in the language of discipline — it will remain 
constituted as “otherised” research, inhabiting the gaps between authorised knowledge. 
 
The Politics of Advantage 
Unless the economy is . . . deconstructively or purposively rewritten, it will write 
itself into every text of social theory, in familiar and powerful ways. When it is 
not overtly theorised [the economy] defines itself as capitalism because it lacks 
another name. (Gibson-Graham, 1995, p. 39) 
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When the words “economy” and “capitalism” are expunged from this passage and replaced 
with other socially formative pairings, the meaning of the text is altered little. The words, it 
seems, hold together as a pro forma template for expressing a truism of modern discursive 
formations. Try rephrasing it: fill the gaps with the dyads of truth and science, sexuality and 
heterosexuality, or epistemology and discipline, and see what happens. You will find, in each 
case, that a historically specific, contingently constructed artifice inserts itself into the equation 
as a naturally interchangeable substitute for the domain it inhabits. It makes no reference to 
what other formations could possibly be inserted, or how they might share the terrain. And this 
is precisely the strength of hegemonic narrative. The specificities which are capitalism, science, 
masculinity, or discipline display no deviance. To the contrary, a binding feature is their ability 
to define themselves by writing alternatives out of the equation, and in so doing, positioning 
themselves as essential, as natural. 
The attention of this paper is directed towards the ways in which this dynamic plays itself 
out in studies of interdisciplinarity. Drawing attention to the ways in which discipline is 
discursively presented as the natural vehicle to epistemological certainty is concurrently an 
acknowledgment that establishing interdisciplinarity as a program and approach to 
understanding which is free from disciplinary coding requires more options than an 
antagonistic choice between discipline or revolution — that is, a binarised choice between 
acceptance or rejection of disciplinary method. 
Resources for broadening the possibilities for challenging the hegemony of disciplinary 
discourse can be drawn from the feminist movement. Feminists within the equal opportunity 
movement of the early 1990s faced many of the quandaries interdisciplinary scholars are now 
encountering. At the time, feminists raised concerns about the openness of strategies which 
position women as either different from or similar to their male counterparts. By arguing that 
women have been systematically excluded from access to many of the advantages enjoyed by 
men, feminists have been able to generate a catalogue of claims for material redistributions 
along gendered lines. In the main, these redistributions have served as correctives, erasing the 
disadvantages which impede women from performing at the level of men. Claiming sameness 
has also worked to claw back appropriated ground by leveraging entry points to realms that 
exclude women based on their difference from men. Women, for example, have gained access to 
the corporate world by minimising the role of motherhood, positioning the care of dependents 
as an issue unrelated to their ability to engage in paid employment. 
However, the strategies of claiming difference and claiming sameness share a common trait. 
Nancy Fraser (1997) argues that both are “remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of 
social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them” (p. 23). 
Neither strategy questions the unremarkability of men’s positioning. In each of these cases, it is 
women who are inscribed as disadvantaged. It is women who are to be given resources to aid 
their participation in the masculinised domains of paid work and public life. Through equal 
employment opportunities, women are granted access to careers. Through the provision of 
childcare, the burden of motherhood is minimised. But in neither case are males expected to 
relinquish any of the advantages which accrue to them by the having of wives and mothers. 
Feminist equality discourses have not demanded that men question their style of contribution to 
child rearing or rethink what constitutes workplace practice. In each case, redistributive equal 
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opportunity policies enable women to participate in malestream3 activities for as long as they 
concurrently and continually reproduce the conditions that enable those proclaiming 
themselves to be unremarkably normal to enjoy differential advantage. As Eveline (1993) puts 
it, in a work which has inspired the title of this paper,  
 
Materially and representationally, advantage and disadvantage are unevenly 
weighted as oppositional halves, as is womanhood and manhood. Asking 
whether a woman is the same as a man is different from asking if a man is the 
same as a woman. Try it on a man and see. (1993, cited in Eveline, 1994, p. 55) 
 
From an Australian perspective, we think interdisciplinarity needs to develop a similarly 
critical eye toward the strategies it employs in positioning itself as a legitimate organ for 
constructing knowledge. The political thought of interdisciplinary advocates has largely centred 
on the creation of typologies which distinguish levels of disciplinary integration. Good (2000), 
for example, argues the interdisciplinary label is to be used where “expertise from more than 
one discipline is required in order to achieve a common aim” (p. 386) and relies on an image of 
disciplines as “historical individuals or lineages characterized by their historical continuity 
rather than by a defining property” (p. 385). It is a model which takes for granted the primacy of 
reified institutions as the source of epistemic insight. It claims that interdisciplinarity is 
derivative of discipline. It also places the burden of proof connected with any claim to authority 
squarely in the court of the interloper — the disciplinarian need not justify her claim to 
authoritative speech, as this is taken for granted. However, when an interdisciplinary worker 
wishes to make use of an insight claimed by a discipline, her presentations are treated as 
unnatural and accorded due scepticism. In this model, all claims to interdisciplinarity require 
disciplinary sanction, implicit or explicit. 
Interdisciplinary practitioners have much to learn from feminism. However, the process of 
generating and transferring metaphor requires sensitivity to the context from which the 
borrowing is drawn and understanding of the site to which it is applied. Mobilising feminist 
resources for thinking through the project of interdisciplinarity must proceed with caution. To 
state the obvious, women have a unique ontology, different from the organs of “non-
disciplinary epistemology.” 
Such feminist thinking is, however, a resource for rendering visible advantages accruing to 
discipline, an institution restricting the relevance of knowledge production in universities. 
Consider three related stereotypes of interdisciplinarity: 
 
a) Interdisciplinarity must develop its own disciplinary foundations if it is to 
flourish. Without a stable core, it will be unable to coordinate various research 
programs, remaining essentially fragmented; 
b) Without a substantive ground of its own, interdisciplinarity is an exercise limited 
to exploring phenomena which fall in the gaps. In other words, 
interdisciplinarity has no basis for practice other than by drawing on resources 
from neighbouring disciplines; and finally, 
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c) Interdisciplinary forays often constitute little more than dilettantism. Disciplines 
specialise precisely because the level of detail required is so overwhelming. 
Precision will inevitably be lost in any attempt to combine insights from different 
areas. Here, interdisciplinary scholars necessarily make a trade-off between 
rigour and scope. With a bent toward the latter, the generalist results are likely to 
be less detailed and dubiously factual. 
Each account gives the advantage to discipline: The first implies that resources enough for 
problem solving can be effectively accumulated only through the centralising force of 
discipline. Not only is “nomadic” thought thoroughly unregimented, it is also eminently 
unadministerable. Secondly, without its own channels of production, interdisciplinary effort 
must know more than one discipline. This logic makes it seem as if one must comprehend a 
whole discipline before a second can be added. Thirdly, there is also advantage to be gained by 
not attempting to do anything too complex. It is much easier to direct effort toward producing a 
primer on Foucault than it is to involve oneself in problems of natural resource management. 
This third stereotype enables an overall acceptance of mediocre standards.4 This is useful for 
rendering universities cosy places to be. Disciplinarians can turn a blind eye, not by denying 
external realities outright, but by locating their interest in a pressing social problem as a context 
for exploring disciplinary interests. 
Read this way, the project of interdisciplinarity looks to be a fanciful impossibility. At best, 
some sharing of ideas can occur, but not at the expense of disciplinary functioning. No scope for 
tackling hypercomplex, fuzzy problems is made available. Below, we explore in more detail the 
ways in which such advantages are maintained. We view our contribution as a resource for 
enabling an independent place for interdisciplinarity to be conceptualised more rigorously. 
 
Dirt and Complexity  
Much in the same way medicine has recognised that maintaining sterile environments works 
against the health of our bodies, we view current interest in interdisciplinarity as a suggestion 
that disciplinarity has gone too far in its attempt at tidying access to knowledge. Academic 
discipline suffers the same consequences of failing to allow children to experiment with dirt. 
Modern domestic life has excluded developing bodies from contact with micro-flora (on the 
advice of health experts) to the extent that they fail to develop resilience. Similarly, relying on 
convention more than insight, discipline is able to easily create interior and exterior surfaces of 
relevance. On the strength of communal consensus, it proclaims the safety of particular 
concerns and guards against contamination from “others outside.” Discipline steeped in 
abstraction is unable, or unwilling, to work with the dirt of complexity. As such, it is being 
overwhelmed by new mutations — it has failed to explore contingencies in a way similar to 
how a sanitised environment fails to prompt a child’s immune response: what is missing in both 
cases is playful contact with impure things. 
This critique of disciplinarity’s tendency toward abstraction is extended by Mary Douglas’ 
anthropological study of the symbolic use of pollution metaphors: 
 
If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left 
with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place. This is a very suggestive 
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approach. It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a 
contravention of that order. Dirt, then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where 
there is dirt there is a system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and 
classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate 
elements. (Douglas, 1970, p. 48) 
 
Her reading enables a vision of discipline as an attempt to impose order in a world where “the 
facts of existence are in a chaotic jumble” (p. 193). Disciplinary methods have created simplified 
models which valorise clarity and exclude substances that would defile its purity. However, we 
are suggesting that interdisciplinarity has garnered so much attention because the cultural 
boundaries created by disciplines have been drawn too tight to enable a fruitful engagement 
with the challenges of late-modern society. Interdisciplinarity needs to create simplified models, 
but in a manner which respects the role of untidiness — it needs to field apparatuses which 
orient us to hypercomplexity. This requires new methods and new approaches to the question 
of epistemology. 
Despite this growing unease, members of disciplinary communities continue to be 
motivated to keep things simple and not try anything too difficult. We argue that this 
motivation is structurally related to the question of masculine advantage. In a patriarchy, men’s 
and women’s relationship to dirt is structured by differing abilities to claim purity — that is, a 
freedom from contamination. 
 
Man’s choice of fatherhood and his claim to the right of paternity always carried 
with it that obverse side of right, the notion if not always the practice of 
responsibility. Motherhood has been a duty without rights, and in this sense is 
easily perceived as a form of exploitation to be rejected. (O’Brien, 1982, p. 110, 
cited in Eveline, 1994, p. 169) 
 
Women find themselves in an autopoietic5 world where they cannot choose to take it or leave it. 
Maternity is an issue which cannot be ignored by women; their biology means they must 
entertain contamination (as it is defined through malestream culture) more frequently.6 The 
biological cycles of women’s bodies conflict with the structure imposed on social productions — 
structures designed with male figurations in mind. Under this regime, men have responsibilities 
but not duties. They are more easily able to walk away from those aspects which pose danger to 
their efficient functioning in society such as child rearing or domestic duties. “[P]ollution 
behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict 
cherished classifications” (Douglas, 1970, p. 48). 
Interdisciplinary scholars face a similar problem. Taking complexity seriously means being 
unable to ignore dirt and its polluting effects. Interdisciplinary workers need to act and reflect 
in the world without the luxury of distance that a static concept of purity provides. An 
adherence to disciplinary method limits the range of resources available for negotiating an 
understanding of the problem at hand in a way that is prone to systematically misrepresent the 
array of opportunities open to human action. Method reduces multiplicity (Booth, 1989) and 
with it the possibility of dealing with novel and non-discursively organised issues. As such, 
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interdisciplinary effort must be directed elsewhere. As Douglas puts it: “ . . . as life must be 
affirmed, the most complete philosophies . . . must find some ultimate way of affirming that 
which has been neglected” (1970, p. 193). 
A concern for the non-discursive places interdisciplinary workers differently to their 
disciplinary counterparts in relation to dirt. The latter are committed to abstraction and 
simplification. Such a commitment is enabled (as we detailed above) by a self-determined 
conception of disciplinary values. Discipline views itself as an autonomous entity, able to reflect 
and act on its own priorities — as a complete system interacting with other such systems. “As 
sub-systems, the individual subject disciplines mutually provide environments for one another, 
and are largely autonomous in establishing their internal standards” (Klüver & Schmidt, 1990, 
p. 307). These internally defined standards protect disciplinary workers from the dirt of 
complexity. Purity within disciplinary systems is defined in such narrow terms that its 
practitioners (those swearing allegiance to the conceptual projects of the respective disciplines) 
are exempted from facing the ambiguity of late-modern conundrums. They are granted the 
right to engage with complexity, but are not bound by duty to do so. 
 
Practical Ideology 
Maintaining the purity of discipline and the advantages this enables is an active process 
involving a continual defence against dirt. In this section, we seek to outline the particular style 
of thought and cognition which enables discipline to effectively neutralise danger. To do this, 
we mobilise the concept of practical ideology. This is used to effect by Eveline (1994) to detail 
the discursive techniques used to maintain the unremarkability of male advantage. She 
illustrates how, in the face of challenges to male identity posed by equal employment 
opportunities, men are able to control the representation of affirmative action in a way that 
neutralises its disruptive potential. 
Practical ideology constitutes itself as an advantage over interdisciplinary methods. It 
enables efficiency in a way unavailable to interdisciplinary work. The human consciousness is 
able to hold in place, at any one time, between five and nine categories — an insight developed 
in a (1956) paper by George Miller called “The Magical Number Seven Plus or Minus Two.” As 
such, any attempt at understanding complexity involves working within these prescribed 
limits. But not all efforts lead to an elucidation of complex problems. Discipline, we argue, has 
developed an economy of thought based on the circulation of sanctioned, institutionally 
approved statements.7 The premium placed on journal articles, as witnessed by the sheer 
volume of resources deployed to prevent their depreciation (by their continual replication in 
other settings), points to this phenomenon and away from the possibility of dealing with novel 
and non-discursively organised issues — the very problems interdisciplinary thinkers are trying 
to work with. 
All elaboration begins with the apprehension of experiences lying beyond current 
conceptual schemata. Take, for example, the phenomenon of ecological dysfunction. It has been 
with us for centuries, but only in the past fifty years has it been rendered remarkable, as an 
object for public comment and concern. Here, “the environment” has been constituted as a new 
category positioned alongside traditional concerns. Such classification makes the job of 
conceptualising responses to ecological disease much easier than would otherwise be the case. 
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Within the university, new departments for environmental studies, sub-disciplines within 
sociology or ecology specialising in the cultural construction of “ecocatastrophy” or biophysical 
aspects of the “environment” respectively (but not both), and economies of environmental 
technologies are enabled by the functional differentiation (Luhmann, 1995) of the environment 
as a social sub-system. In this scenario, sustainability is constituted not as a singularity, 
requiring an overhaul of university practices, but as a problem to be solved through mobilising 
the existing institutional edifice. 
This is practical ideology in action. Here, a new challenge is incorporated into one’s 
conceptual schema by creating space for it alongside existing figurations — as something else to 
think about. In the above example, the number of categories considered in thought is effectively 
extended by one, so that additional concerns can be incorporated without any imposition on 
existing conceptualisations. This is, of course, a process mirrored in other social analyses. Its 
dynamics extend to all forms of practical thought. Further examples would include male 
awareness of feminist claims on work, where equal opportunity is viewed as a subset of specific 
workplace practices, detached from the issue of “motherhood,” which Eveline (1994) carefully 
links to career trajectories. 
The problem with practical ideological thought is twofold. Firstly, it provides no adequate 
model for mediating conflicts that arise from the mismatch of categorical imperatives. The 
ability to manage the interactions between different categories is increasingly threatened by the 
continual addition of new information. Conceptual slippage between categories which would 
otherwise go unnoticed is rendered insoluble, as the number of items accounted for is 
expanded. When the process of practical ideology is followed to its conclusion, a mounting 
crisis of representation ensues. If a conceptual schema’s categories remain inflexible, the need to 
account for increasing complexity strains it to the breaking point — we quickly surpass the 
number of thematic foci which can be kept in mind at any one time. The result, at least 
theoretically, is confusion. 
This brings us to the second problem of practical ideology. It revolves around the 
recognition that the sort of meltdown postulated above rarely occurs in actuality. The question 
is thus: if one’s conceptual schema retains a stable core, how might new concerns be accounted 
for? We suggest that users of practical ideology are able to respond to novel situations only by 
minimising the effective content of newly acquired categories, so as to provide nominal 
disruption to the ongoing practice of “doing-being-ordinary” (Sacks, 1995).8 Many have roundly 
criticised the routine use of terms such as coordination (Wiess, 1981), community participation 
(Rodgers, 1998), sustainability (Davison, 1999), and most notably, interdisciplinarity by 
practitioners, for their inattentiveness to the substantive challenges these concepts pose to 
“business as usual.” Their rhetorical use can be framed as specific cases of practical ideology in 
action. 
Disciplinary communities are often firmly committed to this process, continually regulating 
and distinguishing between those variables or features which need be accounted for and those 
that can safely be ignored in creating an ordered account of the world — diffusing the 
“unreasonable.” We have heard hydrologists, for example, discount their role in resolving 
issues of dryland salinity, preferring to see themselves as providers of “the facts.” They have 
argued that farmers will modify practices only when economically viable alternatives can be 
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found. This places the question of change squarely at the feet of economists, and does not 
require active participation on the part of biophysical scientists. We are sure the receiving 
economist would baulk at the ameliorative task this logic presents to her and want to divide the 
problem otherwise, and most likely in ways that defer ultimate responsibility to stereotyped 
others. If we follow this process to its end, ultimately little will be contributed by the university, 
defined as it is through its composite disciplines. 
 
Threat Management: Practical Ideology in Action 
Val Plumwood’s (1993) compelling exploration of the common oppression of women and 
nature gives over resources for an account of practical ideology’s resilience by tracking the 
process through which the extra-discursive is evacuated of any disruptive potential.9 She 
recognises that the discursive construction of foreign bodies is not a neutral ascription of pre-
existing, self-same characteristics, as positivists would have it. It is instead a highly politicised 
process whereby the constitution of what passes as the normal and acceptable is framed, 
deviance is defined, and strategies which separate the two are formulated. For the purposes of 
this discussion, the normative takes the form of a stable conceptual schema (which can itself be 
read in feminist terms as an expression of phallocentric commitment to the metaphysics of 
presence). In order to minimise the threat new information poses to its functioning, challenges 
are rendered as exterior to the system. Phenomenologically, this makes sense — a new 
experience is likely to confront one as an ostensibly unintelligible oddity (Schutz & Luckmann, 
1973). But, as Plumwood notes, it is not that we make distinctions that counts; it is what we do 
with them that is of principal concern. She suggests that the reception of difference within a 
framework of practical ideology is marked by the label of threat — its status as “other” than 
sameness:  
 
It is not just the fact there is a dichotomy, that distinctions are made between two 
kinds of things, which is the key element in establishing a dualistic relation . . . A 
dualism is more than a relation of dichotomy, difference, or non-identity. . . . In 
dualistic construction . . . the qualities (actual or supposed), the culture, the 
values and the areas of life associated with the dualised other are systematically 
and pervasively constructed and depicted as inferior. (1993, p. 47) 
 
Disarming a threat, be it a particular knowledge or distinctive subject position, is therefore a 
complex process, involving a multifaceted representational strategy that codes the “other” as 
ineffectual and insignificant — that is, unworthy of one’s attention. Plumwood highlights five 
strategies which are deployed to this end. These are backgrounding (denial), radical exclusion 
(or hyperseparation), instrumentalism (via objectification), homogenisation or stereotyping, and 
incorporation. 
It must be stressed that Plumwood is not presenting a list of independent strategies, as if it 
were possible to employ one but not the others. The strategies she notes being used are not 
alternatives but an embedded set of practices adding up to a process. For example, radical 
exclusion works to maximise the perceived distance between discipline and interdisciplinary 
methodologies. Constructing interdisciplinarity in this way, as “other” to discipline, provides a 
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resource for the practice of backgrounding. Backgrounding minimises the visibility of 
interdisciplinary contributions, and obversely maximises the exposure of discipline. 
Backgrounded practices are constructed as inessential or “not worth noticing,” and the process 
of hyperseparation acts to exaggerate this. The distance between the two is maximised by 
combining strategies: Discipline = essential, natural / Interdisciplinarity = derivative and a 
distraction from the activity of producing real science. 
 
Backgrounding 
Backgrounding is a strategy which not only makes distinctions between two kinds of things, but 
also naturalises a hierarchical order — in this case the primacy of discipline over 
interdisciplinary endeavour. Even in this discussion, the term “interdisciplinarity” is 
constructed as a product of the disciplinary economy. The etymology of the word suggests as 
much. Interdisciplinarity is seen by its advocates as a means of transcending the limitations of 
compartmentalised knowledge. And interdisciplinary work can create understandings to meet 
the complex demands of looming socio-environmental problems. But reading interdisciplinarity 
as a practice going beyond established boundaries does not reveal disciplinarity as a dispersed 
network of locally produced practices, mythologies, and artefacts. It simply reinforces the image 
of discipline as a coherent and primal unit of analysis. Without detailed and incisive 
description, disciplines will remain conceptual black boxes on the ground that seem in need of 
supervention by a transcending spirit. 
 
Incorporation 
The definition of the other in relation to the self as a lack or absence is a special 
case of incorporation, defining the other only in relation to the self, or the self’s 
needs and desires. . . . Because the other is defined and perceived in relation to 
the master, he or she is not encountered fully as an independent other, and the 
qualities attributed or perceived are those which reflect the master’s desires, 
needs and lacks. (Plumwood, 1993, p. 52) 
 
The trope of incorporation is highly visible in the debate over interdisciplinarity. 
Constructing discipline as the proto-typical model for any legitimate attempt at generating 
knowledge enables the “master” to undertake a second project of threat abatement. This 
involves creating a discursive form which highlights the primacy of disciplinary activity. It is 
common among both interlopers and disciplinarians to begin a defence or rejection of 
interdisciplinarity with the categorical insistence that discipline breaths life into the possibility 
of interdisciplinary study. In its strongest formulation, this argument asserts the primacy of 
discipline as a resource for innovative study. But even defences of interdisciplinarity targeted as 
a rejection of this logic often do no more than reinscribe its dominance. This is evident in many 
works (e.g., Hodge, 1995; Nissani, 1997) which argue for an interdisciplinarity which crosses 
borders and lives within the interstices, or otherwise transcends the corporeality of discipline 
(Rapport & Klein, forthcoming). Selling interdisciplinarity as a provider of skills which patch 
any holes in existing modes of epistemological articulation (theorisation) presents 
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interdisciplinarity as a complementary endeavour, obscuring the independence of 
interdisciplinary method. 
 
Instrumentalism 
There is much pressure to present interdisciplinarity in this way. One question which gets a fair 
airing concerns when interdisciplinary methods should be employed. They are often resource-
intensive, time-consuming, and frequently have uncertain outcomes (i.e. cannot guarantee the 
delivery of pre-specified products), so it would seem obvious that criteria able to distinguish 
real demand for interdisciplinary approaches from more mundane situations are needed. The 
most direct way to develop new criteria is to posit a model for mediating different levels of risk 
and decision uncertainty similar to that provided by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1985; 1991) and 
presented in figure 1. This model creates some fuzzy categories able to accommodate the 
concerns for criteria for deciding when to employ interdisciplinary methods. When the problem 
is sufficiently well-bounded, then normal science methods can be deployed ,10 with 
complementary strategies being invoked at more diffuse levels.11 Here, the primacy of 
discipline is maintained — super-science is needed simply to augment normal science 
(presumably drawing on normal science as a proto-typical resource).  
APPLIED
SCIENCE
PROFESSIONAL
CONSULTANCY
POSTNORMAL
SCIENCE
Systems Uncertainty
Decision
Stakes
High
High
Low
 
Figure 1 – Three Kinds of Science. (Based on Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991). 
 
Here, disciplinary advantage is maintained by appropriating interdisciplinarity as a 
resource for supplementing normal-science in abnormal situations. 
 
Since the relationship is seen as that of a superior to a separate inferior order, it is 
also seen as fitting and natural that the lower side serves the upper as a means to 
his ends. The upperside is an end in itself, but the underside has no such intrinsic 
value, is not for-itself but merely useful, a resource. (Plumwood, 1993, p. 53) 
 
In Funtowicz and Ravetz’s two-dimensional model, the need for post-normal science is 
exceptional. Only when concepts become fuzzy and the number of variables overwhelms 
normal methods is interdisciplinarity advocated. Here, interdisciplinarity is not presented as a 
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challenge but as a complement to disciplinary method. The interloper is a resource for the 
disciplinary project. 
We have worked to break down this stereotype. Elsewhere (Booth et al., 2000), we have 
argued interdisciplinarity is not simply a tool like a Swiss Army knife — useful in an emergency 
but of little value where precision is required. Although an interdisciplinary worker draws on a 
number of fields for inspiration, she uses the methods from those fields with a sense of their 
differing appropriateness in differing contexts. Precision for a person using an algorithm is 
getting the measurement exact. For an interdisciplinary research team worker, it may be saying 
clearly what options there are and how no one can be exact. The degree of commitment to the 
established methods is very different. 
It is not simply that scholars from various backgrounds need team skills to help others 
understand their particular specialism, as if the problem was one of informing others. What 
counts as expertise in interdisciplinary settings centres on an ability to remain collectively 
focused on the text at hand. Without this, we have fragmented knowledges, not a scholarship of 
between-ness. It is only through ongoing and effortful engagements which ensure 
communication between practitioners that independent methodology emerges12 (Boulding, 
1989). People talk constructively if they are able to share experiences, tell stories, and build 
through narratives a sense of each other’s insights and practical skills. A coherent solution that 
is sufficiently adaptive needs many disciplines. However, the knowledges they contribute are 
aspects of an emergent pattern, not like tiles whose contribution to a pattern is just the sum of 
their individual aspects, but like an orchestra whose individual sounds make little sense until 
they are merged into the experience of the whole performance. Interdisciplinarity is thus a craft, 
like that of an artist, a musician, or an actor. In order to remedy the image of knowledge still 
prominent in interdisciplinary work, practitioners need easier ways to speak of how problems 
can be dealt with skilfully in a diverse group of professionals and locals and worked through 
collectively. 
Including skill and teamwork in the definition of post-normal science breaks up the 
neatness of Funtowicz and Ravetz’s quasi flow diagram in a way that unsettles the assumption 
of disciplinary axiology. It is no longer possible to see the problem in terms of an isotropic and 
planiform abstraction, where different skills are needed for different tasks (i.e., normal science 
vs. professional consultancy vs. post-normal science); rather, the issue of skill interpenetrates all 
levels. This implies the need for post-normal institutions: those which are able to mobilise skill 
in order to identify what sort of action is appropriate at any one time. Skill is latently present in 
each situation even if normal science activities are undertaken every time. Skill enables 
discernment in a way that avoids contradictions between managers who operate in a 
professional consultancy mode, scientists who work at the level of normal science principles, 
and complex problems which reside in the realm of the post-normal. These groups are no 
longer in discrete conflict but are armed with the capacity to see interconnections between their 
different modes and are able to see how they contribute. 
 
Radical Exclusion 
Interdisciplinarity is viewed not only as dependent, but also as radically different from 
discipline. Emphasising the distance between the two approaches is important for the practice 
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of practical ideology. Maintaining the productive functioning of an existing but static 
conceptual structure requires any force which might interrupt its algorithmic flow to be 
neutralised. As Plumwood writes, this is achieved through the action of dualised thought, 
which posits the existence of mutually exclusive interior and exterior surfaces: 
 
A major aim of dualistic construction is polarisation, to maximise distance or 
separation between the dualised spheres and to prevent their being seen as 
continuous or contiguous. . . . Thus men are defined as active, intellectual, 
egoistic, competitive and dominant, while women are defined as possessing the 
complementary qualities, as passive, intuitive, altruistic, nurturant and 
submissive. (1993, p. 49) 
 
In the same way, interdisciplinary scholars are treated as, at best, a distraction from the main 
“game.” They might be recognised, but not as sharing similar concerns and valuing the same 
projects. As Booth notes, “politics is always about inclusion and exclusion. Even a practical 
query such as ‘What shall we do next?’ raises as an issue the ‘we’ to whom the question is 
appealing” (1997, p. 132). Disciplinary work clearly understands the identity of the “we” — that 
is, those to be included (see Opotow, 1990). 
The specificities of hyperseparation can be elucidated through what we have termed the 
“morning after effect.”13 The morning after effect emerges because within the contemporary 
disciplinary framework, there is no clear way of articulating what the interdisciplinary worker 
is interested in; one day she may be engaged in vigorous conversation but the morning after she 
may be distant. The means used by others (their tools) may be fascinating, while the ends they 
feel deeply attached to receive no strong commitment from the interdisciplinary practitioner. 
Because she disregards the normal terms of friendship (sharing both means and ends), the 
practitioner becomes suspect, ambiguous, or even viewed as dangerous. This happened to 
Harold Garfinkel, whose Studies in Ethnomethodology has given sociologists major new tools for 
inquiring into social processes. Garfinkel applied this concept to radio astronomy and traced the 
development of a couple of researchers’ conviction that they had made a new discovery in their 
field. Garfinkel refused to reframe their delight in any other terms but the emergence of a new 
discourse. A reviewer of Garfinkel’s study (in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1981) finished his 
piece on it with the sentence “Garfinkel is a dangerous man.” The judgement wasn’t clarified, 
but the feel of it seems to be Garfinkel’s refusal to enter the spirit of the game of facts. In this 
case, he had studied the game of radio astronomy in great detail but without any commitment 
to its self-image. For some of those on the receiving end, such blind reaction can be devastating, 
and therefore unacceptable. An interdisciplinarian is frequently using the tools but not playing 
the game. This is why some people will tend to shy away from interdisciplinarity. It can mean 
exile from established communities. Under the current regime, there is no warm reception, and 
to be interdisciplinarity you either need a thick skin or a sufficiently rich history. Either way, the 
interdisciplinary researcher is likely to be labelled an “outsider.” 
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Homogenisation 
Currently, we have few labels for describing what interdisciplinarians actually do. The existing 
framework distributes titles based on discrete speciality. This involves the ability to account for 
a small aspect of the world with precision. To those able to easily place themselves within this 
system of categorisation, the interdisciplinary scholar will look out of place, even nameless. 
And without a way to locate their projects, it will seem as if interdisciplinary workers hold an 
amorphous set of interests devoid of a unifying theme. The inability to easily describe what 
such scholars “do” using existing terms of language results in the ascription of a default identity 
— one based on nondescriptness. Because interdisciplinarians cannot often be described as 
belonging to a collective but differentiated “us,” then logically they must belong to the black 
box category labelled “them.” 
 
More than polarisation is needed if a relationship is to be an appropriate one for 
domination. The dominated class must appear suitably homogeneous if it is to be 
able to conform to and confirm its ‘nature’. In homogenisation, differences 
among the inferiorised group are disregarded. . . . Homogenisation supports 
both instrumentalism, incorporation (relational definition) and radical exclusion. 
It produces binarism. A division of the world into two orders. (Plumwood, 1993, 
pp. 53-54) 
 
Plumwood’s account of dualised thought chronicles the mechanisms by which discipline 
maintains its advantage. Combined, these strategies reinforce in the mind of the “master” the 
naturalness of form in her (or his) conceptual schema, exempting her from having to take note 
of the “monstrous” (Hodge, 1995). Practical ideology stands as a cognitive schema which 
supports an analytic/synthetic vision of reality14 and an associated algorithmic mode of 
functioning. It enables the valorisation of simplified models in a quest for Taylorist efficiency15 
over and above a concern for complexity. The sociologist, for example, shaped by ongoing 
learning centred on the study of sociality, becomes interested in psychology only where its 
conception of the subject can be converted into her local currency. Practical ideology works at 
these boundaries — psychology becomes all that which is over there. The sociologist can 
discount psychic concerns, rendering them beyond the pale, by maintaining the separateness of 
her own projects through the methods noted above. These practices work against 
interdisciplinarity by setting practitioners against one another. Where integration is needed, we 
find tribal factionalism, the maintenance of discrete positions, and the spectre of relativism. 
Discipline has a method for managing complexity overload, but its method (as per Plumwood) 
is divisive, hierarchical, and increasingly seen as ineffective. 
Interdisciplinarity requires its own form of discipline. The question of interdisciplinarity 
does not hinge on being or not being disciplined, but rather centres on the form of rigour 
demanded by respective approaches. That late-modern complexity is not well handled by 
discipline suggests that post-disciplinary approaches need a penchant for working with 
overdetermined concepts and unarticulated possibilities and require “cultivating a readiness to 
see what remains to be shown” (Bontekoe, 1996, p. 115). Disciplinary method is not sufficient in 
creating purified and abstract approximations of experience. Disciplinary modes of working 
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systematically exclude the dirt which is needed for creative solutions. Mary Douglas uses the 
metaphor of a garden: 
 
A garden is not a tapestry; if all the weeds are removed, the soil is impoverished. 
Somehow the gardener must preserve fertility by returning what he has taken 
out. The special kind of treatment which some religions accord to anomalies and 
abominations to make them powerful for good is like turning weeds and lawn 
cuttings into compost. (1970, p. 193) 
 
Paradoxically, in seeking efficiency, discipline sacrifices a more mature form of discipline. 
This is one which allows untidiness to serve a productive function in resolving complex 
problems. The West has few resources for elaborating modes of understanding which refuse 
categorisation.16 As such, we turn to the Zen Buddhist Oxherding pictures of Kaku-an (Suzuki, 
1950). This set of ten images has been used as a teaching tool and source of reflection for seven 
to eight hundred years. Its protagonist seeks a wild “undisciplined” ox that turns to white as it 
becomes settled with the ox herder. Symbolising “self,” this ox becomes the source of something 
beyond discipline, a wisdom that culminates in new understanding. Its central motif is of a 
passage from a state of undisciplined confusion, through the narrow defile of discipline to a 
mode of acting and being that is constructive, responsive, and creatively at one with nature. It is 
to this form of discipline that interdisciplinarity normatively aspires. 
 
Conclusion 
Interdisciplinarity faces two interwoven problems in presenting itself as a real and coherent 
alternative to disciplinary actualisations. The first concerns interdisciplinarity as a positive 
program of understanding. An answer to the question of “how to do” interdisciplinary research 
 a concern which continues to perplex many scholars seeking a systematic account of the term 
and the practices which it organises  is found in the delineation of interdisciplinarity as an 
independent method. This is an undertaking we have developed elsewhere (Booth et al., 2000).  
Articulating these dimensions of interdisciplinary method is an important component of 
any program seeking to render late-modern complexity intelligible. On its own, this functional 
program does not resolve the question of strategy, however. The theoretical virtues attached to 
interdisciplinarity notwithstanding, its future as a practical project lies in negotiating the 
material and representational economy into which it is deployed. Eveline (1994) points to the 
impossibility of envisioning an interdisciplinarity which would seek to up-end the relative 
positions of discipline and interdisciplinarity, in a reversal of hegemony. This is because the 
latter needs to discover its own positive program of research. Whatever this might be, it will be 
different, in form and structure, from that of discipline. As such, its mode of representing and 
organising itself will involve renegotiating the criteria about which judgements of epistemic 
legitimacy are framed. 
The second problem, then, concerns how we might move toward a new regime of 
knowledge production, one more sensitive to the complexities inherent in the late-modern 
world. The attention of this paper has been directed towards developing clearings in which 
strategies enabling an adequate response to this dimension of the interdisciplinary problem can 
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emerge. In other words, we ask if the interdisciplinarity we need can grow from the structural 
arrangements and current understanding there is about epistemology and its manifestations in 
social relations. 
We believe it can and must. Interdisciplinarity practitioners have no choice but to move 
with the present regime as part and parcel of a strategy for going beyond it. In arguing that 
discipline needs replacing, an image of interdisciplinarity is often mobilised which emphasises 
interdisciplinarity’s ability to process complex problems in ways unavailable to discipline. 
Nissani (1997), for example, sets forth ten virtues of interdisciplinarity, claiming that 
interdisciplinarity extends the capacity of normal science by bringing to it resources otherwise 
unavailable. This strategy of introducing interdisciplinarians as innovators against a backdrop 
of “business as usual” works to point out differences in epistemic approach. It is an insufficient 
basis on which to mount a challenge to disciplinary hegemony, however. Discipline is more 
than a cognitive schema. Embedded in the wider political economy, it is sustained by 
maintaining linkages and regulating resource flows and via the selective irrigation of particular 
subjectivities (with all the infrastructural investment this entails). Discipline is not simply an 
intellectual pursuit; it is also institutionally produced. Accordingly, in addition to the question 
of interdisciplinary method, we require an understanding of how activists of interdisciplinarity 
might contest the structural determinations of discipline. 
Framing the problem in this way gives insight into how interdisciplinary work in the future 
can best play the political game of making a difference. Should interdisciplinary scholars be 
between the boundaries of other areas, exhorting those protected within to choose relevance 
and come out into the cold? Or do we need boundaries for interdisciplinary work, carefully and 
vigorously controlled, so that we can always point to interdisciplinary work that has been done 
sloppily? Is there a place for full theoretical awareness of what distinguishes interdisciplinary 
work? Does it need, like any discipline, its own self-regulating guild? In response to each 
question, we maintain that without holding in mind a framework based on processes for 
handling such political concerns, any attempt to formulate answers will inevitably involve the 
re-inscription of disciplinary codes. And this, we are sure, provides no real answers, just 
disciplinary practice in a new guise, coming no closer to meeting the demands of a 
hypercomplex world. 
 
 
Notes 
1. In several places, material from Booth et al. (2000) has been added to this paper. Locations are not 
marked but can be sourced via a downloadable copy of the report at: 
http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/ projects/srodgers/lwrrdc.html. This research emerges from 
work sponsored by the then Land and Water Resources Research and Development Corporation 
(LWRRDC), Canberra (now known as Land and Water Australia). 
2. The concept of work used here is given specific meaning by Hannah Arendt. As Booth (1989) 
elaborates, her rendering enables us to conceptualise disciplinary productivity in a manner which 
evacuates it of any hubris which discipline may attach. In The Human Condition (1958, p.7) Arendt writes: 
“Work provides an “artificial” world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within 
its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them 
all.” For her, work is an abstracted entity, describing inauthentic practice, which is to be juxtaposed with 
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“action” — “the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or 
matter,” which “corresponds to the human condition of plurality” (cited in Booth, 1989, p.197). 
3. This is a term commonly used within feminist discourses. It is designed to denote the unquestioned 
normalcy of masculine traditions — i.e. of history being both all about men and severely neglectful of 
talking explicitly about them. “Malestream” is associated with the work of Mary O’Brien, especially 
O’Brien (1981). 
4. Eveline (1994) traces this phenomenon in practices of corporate and bureaucratic management, arguing 
the lowered bar is a consequence of masculine culture. The career support networks which are often 
enjoyed by men but not women are governed by the logic of gaming, where the intention is not to win 
but to see the game continue. This means the player (read “man”) must “pick his battles” strategically, 
and lose others just as strategically, to keep the game from getting lopsided. Her narration of one 
woman’s perspective on this issue is illustrative: 
. . . having seen how seniority was often accorded men who had lengthy and compliant 
service but relatively little expertise, she now understood that the problem hinged on an 
overall acceptance of mediocre standard. Those lowered standards showed also in the 
“deals” that provided the basis on which bureaucratic business was done. The sort of 
activities that Edmund saw as perfectly legitimate, like trade-offs about budgeting and 
policy, Rhonda saw as morally inappropriate. . . . The bureaucracy, as she saw it, 
supported self-interest and shoddy decision-making. Rhonda felt that mediocrity was 
encouraged in most of her male peers, as a hedge against them threatening any major 
changes to either the bureaucracy or those at the top. (Eveline, 1994, pp.148-149) 
5. Autopoiesis literally means “self-production” and refers to a system able to retain its stability despite 
being subject to the forces of change. It is a term brought to prominence by Maturana and Varela (1980) in 
the exploration of the links between biology and cognition. 
6. DiQuinzio adds insight to this idea in her detailed questioning of motherhood: 
Sexism and male dominance in an individualist ideological context rely on and 
perpetuate the naturalization of women’s difference in terms of female embodiment. . . . 
On the other hand, avoiding the issue of embodiment does not preclude the 
reconsolidation of essential motherhood. Thus, it seems that feminist theory, especially 
feminist accounts of mothering, must confront directly the issue of embodiment despite 
the risks that this poses. (1999, p. 88) 
7. Latour and Woolgar (1979) illustrate the existence of such an economy through the use of a 
hypothetical observer of a scientific laboratory, who is neither a “total newcomer” to society nor a 
complete participant in scientific endeavour, but has a working knowledge of contemporary culture and 
its artefacts. Never having entered a laboratory, this individual is bewildered by its activities. It has all the 
characteristics of a manufacturing production line but what it claims to be its outputs aren’t “value 
added” materials, but reports about those products; moreover, they are ones created through 
juxtaposition with the outputs of other like institutions. “How is it that the costly apparatus, animals, 
chemicals, and activities of the bench space combine to produce a written document, and why are these 
documents so highly valued by participants?” (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 48). 
8. Agnes Heller’s Everyday Life (1984) maps this process of doing-ordinariness closely, arguing it is a 
default mode of social existence for those who have not taken up the challenge of individuality, marked 
as it is by its realisation of species essentiality. Abstract as it sounds, she argues that this inauthentic 
mode enables survival within a given context by instrumental appropriation of social standards and 
moral codes, but not engagement with one’s authentic concern. 
9. This trace can also be undertaken using the resources provided by Douglas’s analysis of purity and 
danger. 
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10. The term “applied science” is used to draw attention to the everyday Kuhnian practice of puzzle-
solving in science. “Puzzle-solving” puts the scientist in the intellectual elitist position of the detective, 
who, often bugged by police bungling and public delusory assumptions, at last finds the hidden realities 
in all their puzzle-box complexity. 
11. With increased complexity and decision stakes, we pass through the realm of professional consultancy 
— which is more like the practice of social work than the magic technological fix of Dr. Who — to post-
normal science. This is a domain for activity which can be viewed as what “nice educated expert people” 
would rather not have. Applied scientists will characterise this domain as arbitrary and irregular, 
“peopled by NIMBYs, NGOs, activists, anti-science elements and all sorts of other nasty creatures” 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1998), all of whom have to be accommodated by the practitioner. 
12. Booth and Eveline (1990) extend this analysis to account for solo efforts of interdisciplinarity. They 
combine insight from hermeneutics with the grieving process of death and dying in showing research to 
be an emotional process of nurturing and letting go as ideas shift and develop. A readiness and ability to 
expose oneself to the emotionality of seeking to remain open to new experiences characterises 
interdisciplinary endeavour at an individual level. 
13. This term was coined as a way of linking the dynamic described here with the uncomfortable feeling 
one sometimes encounters after an invigorating discussion with a new acquaintance. The energy of this 
first conversation generates expectations that cannot always be carried through to subsequent meetings. 
It’s confusing to know a past conversation was rewarding but be unable to resume where you left off. 
This dynamic also seems to account for the awkwardness experienced after a “one-night stand.” 
14. This is an approach which attempts to “divide complex problems down into distinct items and then 
seek to regain the whole through their reassembly” (Booth, 1993, p.185). 
15.The simplicity of Adam Smith’s account of pin manufacturing is an apt metaphor for describing the 
sort of logic driving disciplinary specialisation. 
16. Contemporary hermeneutics has articulated this problem in terms of the need to frame attempts at 
understanding phenomena by recourse to diachronic and synchronic dimensions simultaneously. 
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